A Multilayer Secured Messaging Protocol for REST-based Services by Eteng, Idongesit Efaemiode
Journal of International Technology and Information Management 
Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 2 
2019 
A Multilayer Secured Messaging Protocol for REST-based 
Services 
Idongesit Efaemiode Eteng 
Dr, ideteng@unical.edu.ng 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jitim 
 Part of the Business Intelligence Commons, Communication Technology and New Media Commons, 
Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, Data Storage Systems Commons, Digital 
Communications and Networking Commons, E-Commerce Commons, Information Literacy Commons, 
Management Information Systems Commons, Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods 
Commons, Operational Research Commons, Science and Technology Studies Commons, Social Media 
Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eteng, Idongesit Efaemiode (2019) "A Multilayer Secured Messaging Protocol for REST-based Services," 
Journal of International Technology and Information Management: Vol. 28 : Iss. 3 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/jitim/vol28/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Journal of International Technology and Information Management by an authorized editor of CSUSB 
ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
Journal of International Technology and Information Management  Volume 28, Number 3 2019 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017        43       ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
 
A Multilayer Secured Messaging Protocol for REST-
based Services 
 
ETENG Idongesit E. 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Calabar 
P. M. B. 1115 
Calabar 
Email: ideteng@unical.edu.ng, idongesitessien@yahoo.com 
 
OLUFEMI Oluwaseun O., 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Calabar 
P. M. B. 1115 






The lack of a descriptive language and security guidelines poses a big challenge 
to implementing security in Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture. 
There is over reliance on Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security 
(SSL/TLS), which in recent times has proven to be fallible. Some recent attacks 
against SSL/TLS include: POODLE, BREACH, CRIME, BEAST, FREAK etc. A 
secure messaging protocol is implemented in this work. The protocol is further 
compiled into a reusable library which can be called by other REST services. The 
library can be reused by .NET applications and the implementation steps can also 
be followed by other REST services developers using other platforms.  
 
Keywords: protocol, secure messaging, encryption, signature, confidentiality, 
message integrity,  
  
A Multilayer Secured Messaging Prototcol for REST-Based Services             E. Idongesit E. & O. Olowaseun O. 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017       44         ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many of today’s businesses now rely on the web of intelligent services that can 
interface with other services and applications; desktop, web and even mobile 
devices. Each of these services and applications may handle different portions of 
data storage and business rules and may reside on different machines dispersed 
across networks all over the globe. The Web Service concept offers a way to unite 
information distributed between these critical business-centric applications, 
regardless of the hardware, operating system, language and platform for which the 
applications are developed. The two leading protocols for web services are; SOAP 
and REST. SOAP uses Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) for data exchange 
while REST uses XML, JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) and a host of other 
data formats for data exchange, prominent among which is JSON. REST is also 
more lightweight than SOAP. While SOAP is still retained by some prominent 
technology companies such as PayPal, Docusign and Salesforce, REST is quickly 
winning out and now represents over 70% of public APIs (Hunsaker, 2015).   
In spite of the increase in the growth of popularity and the rate of adoption of REST 
services over SOAP web services, the issue of security in REST services has not 
been adequately addressed. Developers are left to implement their own security 
protocols. Since there are no standard security guidelines to follow, and the fact 
that REST-based web services are easier to implement than their SOAP equivalent, 
developers tend to haphazardly get their web services deployed in a hurry without 
taking cognizance of the security implications of their work; thereby, exposing 
their applications to serious vulnerabilities. According to Symantec (2013), web 
applications are getting attacked more frequently. In the past five years, there have 
been various application layer attacks, targeted at web services such as: Denial of 
Service (DoS), Unauthorized Access, Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
injection, Broken Authentication, Cross Site Scripting (XSS), Distributed Denial 
of Service (DDoS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), Message Delay/Replay 
attacks etc.   
The approach proposed in this paper is to implement a multi-layer approach which 
includes a series of cryptographic protocols, secure hashing, certificate parsing, 
certificate generation and some other protocols. The first layer of the security 
protocol is to implement an SSL/TLS while transporting the message over the wire 
while the second layer is to implement an end–to–end protection of the message 
which acts as a fallback layer if the security of the first layer is ever compromised. 
This paper therefore aims proffering an end to end security solution for 
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Representational State Transfer (REST) –based web services. Our key 
contributions in this paper include:  
 
• A message signing and signature verification algorithm using “http signatures” 
. 
• A message encryption and decryption module using Advanced Encryption 
System (AES) and Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) algorithms. 
• A nonce-based system for preventing Delay attacks. 
• An SSL/TLS secured channel of communication using StartSSL.  
• A payment collection Application Programming Interface (API) for Students’ 
Fees payment (service provider). 
• An Interface that models the core banking posting platform of banks (service 
consumer). This service consumer accepts payments information from the 
service provider, integrating the security protocol developed. 
 





This section reviews works previously done regarding the security protocol for 
RESTful Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).  
Serme et al., (2014) developed a security protocol modeled after Web Services 
Security (WS-Security). WS-Security is an extension to SOAP based Web Services 
that make use of such standards as Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
Encryption and XML Signature to provide an end-to-end security (Soldano, 2015). 
In addition to designing the security protocol, a performance evaluation 
comparison was done between the protocol and the WS-Security. Their result 
showed that the encryption was slower than signature for SOAP based WS-
Security while their security protocol showed a better performance time for 
encryption than signature for small amount of data while the signature became 
faster than encryption when the size of data was large. By way of comparison, their 
work makes use of a third party certificate to provide Non-Repudiation property 
which comes at an additional cost. Certificate Authorities can sometimes be a 
burden as they can be vulnerable to attackers. When they are compromised, they 
can be forced to issue false certificates (Zeter, 2011). False certificates can be used 
to impersonate one of the parties involved in a transaction in order to get 
information. The protocol used in their work is called Sign – then – encrypt. It 
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means the sender signs the payload and then encrypts it before sending it to the 
recipient. The recipient then decrypts the message before verifying the signature. 
This process has an inherent disadvantage of the recipient having to decrypt all 
messages, even the ones that do not pass integrity test.   
The end-to-end protocol described in this paper combines a unique ID generated 
for each client with the digital signature to ensure Non-repudiation. In addition, 
this work makes use of Secure Hash Algoritm-512 (SHA512) cryptographic 
primitive as the hash algorithm for ensuring the integrity of the message. The work 
described in this paper makes use of an encrypt – then – sign protocol, which means 
payloads are first encrypted before being signed at the sender end. This means 
information must pass the integrity test at the receiver end before the information 
is decrypted. The advantage of this protocol is that messages that would not pass 
integrity test are not wasted time on being decrypted as designed in the work of 
(Serme et al., 2014). Furthermore, even though the end-to-end protocol can 
function in the absence of SSL/TLS, it relies on the SSL/TLS as an additional fall 
back layer in case the protocol is breached.  
Sporny, (2013) described a simple messaging protocol for web payments. His work 
is a draft submitted to the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). That great work 
provides detailed guideline protocol for securing web applications but the work has 
no implementation beyond the fact that it serves as a guide. Moreover, the approach 
does not target REST specifically. This paper not only implements the protocol but 
also implements it as a re-usable library for the .NET and Java developers.   
Mohamed & Mohamed, (2014) highlighted the security flaws of RESTful services 
in their work. While their work did not implement any specific security protocol, 
they did mention some security implementations for RESTful services; such as 
TLS plus Message Digest and Open standard for Authorization (OAuth). While 
OAuth1.0 is deemed a success, OAuth 2.0 was more complex, less interoperable 
and less secure.   
Another popular approach to securing RESTful services is using “secure” 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTPS). (Lee & Mehta, 2013) presented a threat 
model to RESTful applications. They showed how RESTful services could be 
vulnerable to JSON input attack. JSON input attack provides a window of 
opportunity for attackers to execute malicious scripts. They showed how 
encryption via HTTPS could be used to mitigate input attacks. While HTTPS could 
mitigate input attacks, recent research shows that HTPPS is not infallible. Recent 
attacks on HTTPS include POODLE, CRIME, BEAST, BREACH, etc. (Meyer & 
Schwenk, 2013), (Kovacs, 2015). The approach in this paper implemented an end-
to-end layer in addition to the TLS in order to harden the security.  
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Lenka & Nayak (2014) published a great paper on how to enhance data security in 
the cloud. They proposed a model that uses RSA for encryption and RSA with 
MD5 for authentication and integrity. Their choice of RSA to encrypt message 
directly is not great because RSA is an asymmetric algorithm and therefore very 
slow and very costly for encrypting large data. Their choice of RSA with MD5 for 
signature makes the signature scheme weak because MD5 is already broken 
(Sasaki & Aoki, 2009), (Mao et al, 2009) and (Ness, 2012). Since, asymmetric 
signature algorithms require that the hash function used be collision resistant 
(Sotirov, 2008), combining RSA with MD5 for signature would therefore make the 
resulting signature scheme weak.  On the contrary, the signature scheme proposed 
in this work makes use of HMAC SHA-512 signature scheme. Apart from the fact 
that SHA512 is stronger than MD5, HMAC, unlike other asymmetric signing 
algorithms like RSA, DSA, ECDSA etc., is more resistant to collisions than their 
underlying hashing algorithms (Kim, 2006).  
Similarly, (Fashoto et al., 2010) published an authentication model which uses 
RSA with MD5 for authentication and integrity check.  All the flaws pointed out 
in the work of Lenka & Neyak (2014) applies to their work as well. This paper uses 
HMAC with SHA512 for authentication and integrity. The protocol also 
incorporates confidentiality.  
Dudhe & Sherekkar (2014) carried out a performance analysis of SOAP and REST- 
based web services. They conducted different experiments on both and concluded 





Prob 1: A lack of standardized protocol for RESE-based web services. 






The paper addresses the key security features; Authentication, Authorization, 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Non-Repudiation as well as some well documented 
attacks like Replay attacks, POODLE, BREACH, CRIME etc. The security 
protocol employed a two-layer approach.   
A Multilayer Secured Messaging Prototcol for REST-Based Services             E. Idongesit E. & O. Olowaseun O. 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017       48         ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
1. At the first layer was a protocol based approach, SSL/TLS over HTTP. 
HTTP is the de-facto communication protocol for the web. SSL/TLS over 
HTTP, which is represented as “https”, indicates that a secure channel of 
communication exists between the server’s web server and the client’s 
browser. The “s” appended to “http” indicates SSL/TLS. This layer was 
configured with strong cryptographic primitives like the AES256 GCM, 
ECDHE, SHA256, etc. If this layer is compromised, the second layer forms 
another protective layer over the message.  
2. The second security layer describes an orderly set of steps to ensure 
authentication, integrity and encryption of the message. The end product of 
this layer is a reusable library. A high level overview of the protocol is as 
described below;  
a. The receiver generates an asymmetric public key pair, publishes a message 
ID and public key of the key pair in a key management service   
b. The receiver generates a symmetric key and an application ID for each 
client, stores the information in the database and securely transports the key 
and the ID to the client. The mode of transportation could be through an 
encrypted email other secure means.  
c. The sender generates an AES symmetric key, encrypts the data to be sent 
to the receiver with this symmetric key using the AES algorithm  
d. The sender uses the RSA public key of the receiver to encrypt the AES 
symmetric key  
e. The sender digitally signs the encrypted message using the HMAC 
authentication scheme  
f. The sender verifies the signature for message integrity, replay and timing 
attacks  
g. The sender decrypts the encrypted cipher  
 
Development Model Used  
 
The paper adopted a variant of the Feature Driven Development (FDD) 
methodology. FDD was devised by Jeff De Luca in 1997 and is one of the agile 
methods of application development. The project was split into the following sub-
domains/major parts; and the interaction amongst the subdomains is depicted in the 
diagram of Figure 1.  
1. Cryptographic Keys Management Service  
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2. HMAC Authentication Scheme  
3. Encryption and Decryption   
4. SSL/TLS  
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Cryptographic Keys Management Service  
 
The key management service administers cryptographic keys used for the message 
encryption and the symmetric keys used for digital signature. For the asymmetric 
key service, which involves a key pair (public and private), the public key is 
published on a service which is assessed through the secure channel (https) by all 
intending clients. The corresponding private key is saved in the configuration file 
and the configuration file is encrypted on the machine. For the signature scheme, 
an Application ID and symmetric key pair is generated for each client and stored 
in the database. These parameters (Application ID and Symmetric Key), alongside 
other parameters like nonce, timestamp and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of 
the service are used to construct the signature.  
 
Encryption and Decryption  
 
This process makes use of the keys produced by the key management for its 
implementation. The encryption/decryption module is summarized below:  
 
1. The plain text is encrypted with the AES256 symmetric encryption key.  
2. The public key of the RSA is used to encrypt the AES symmetric key.  
3. The recipient, which holds the corresponding private key of the RSA 
algorithm, uses the private key to decrypt the RSA cipher in order to obtain 
the AES symmetric key.  
4. The AES symmetric key is then used to decrypt the AES encrypted cipher of 
step 1. The result of this decryption process is the plain text.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 represent the activity diagrams for the encryption and decryption 
processes respectively  
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HMAC Authentication Scheme 
 
This process makes use of the keys produced by the key management service for 
its implementation. The flow on the sender’s side is described below and illustrated 
by the activity diagram of figure 4:  
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1. The sender retrieves the Application ID and the Application key from a secure 
location.  
2. The sender generates a unique ID, known as nonce and a timestamp.  
3. The sender constructs a message to be transmitted to the receiver by 
concatenating the following parameters; Application ID, HTTP request 
method (POST, GET, PUT and DELETE), Uniform Resource Identifier 
(URI), time stamp, nonce, and payload. The payload is the actual message to 
be sent and is Base 64 encoded.  
4. The unique digital signature for this message is generated by hashing the 
message constructed from the previous step using (SHA512) and the API Key 
retrieved from a secure location.   
5. This digital signature is concatenated with the Application ID, the nonce and 
the timestamp generated in step 2 and this concatenated string is then sent 
together with the message as constructed in step 3, through the Authorization 
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The flow on the receiver’s end is described below and illustrated by the activity 
diagram of figure 5:  
 
1. The receiver accepts all the data as sent by the message sender and retrieves 
the following parameters from the authorization header (APPID, Signature, 
Nonce and Time stamp).  
2. The receiver retrieves the API key that corresponds to the APP ID from the 
secure repository.  
3. If the APP ID exists in the repository, the receiver of the message then 
validates if the request is a replay request and rejects it, therefore preventing 
the API from any replay attacks. The time stamp alongside the unique nonce 
generated in step 2 of the client’s flow is used to nullify the replay attacks. The 
receiver checks if the nonce has been used within certain acceptable time 
bounds, i.e. in this case, three minutes.  
4. The receiver then rebuilds the message received from the sender by adhering 
to the same order the parameters were fed into the signature algorithm at the 
sender end. The parameter order and the encoding format must be the same as 
in the sender application. This parameter order and encoding format are 
communicated to the client/sender of the message is always made formal using 
proper documentation.  
5. The receiver hashes the string generated in step 4 above by employing the 
same SHA512 algorithm used by the sender and the same API Key obtained 
from the key management service.  
6. The resulting hash function, which is the signature generated by the receiver 
is compared to the one sent by the sender, if the hashes are the same, it means 
the message originates from who the sender claims to be since the key used 
belongs to the APP ID for the sender (Authentication). It also means the 
message has not been tampered with while in transit (Integrity).  
7. The sender then processes the request, otherwise the request will not be 
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The handshaking procedure for communication between the sender and receiver 
was designed. Microsoft’s SChannel software library was employed for the 
SSL/TLS implementation. Outlined below were the steps taken to design the 
SSL/TLS security protocol layer.  
 
• The public/private key pair was generated.   
• A Certificate Signing Request (CSR) was created from Internet Information 
Service (IIS) using the 2048-bit keys generated.   
• A 256-bit certificate was acquired from “AlphaSSL”.   IIS was then 
configured to enable SSL.  
• SSL/TLS configuration was then hardened to make it resistance to SSL/TLS 
attacks such as BEAST, CRIME, POODLE, BREACH etc.  
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The three categories of tests carried out were:  
 
• Penetration Test – this test category carries out penetrative tests on the protocol 
and specifically tests for vulnerabilities to some attacks.   
• SSL/TLS Configuration Test – this test category assesses the strength of the 
SSL/TLS configurations.  
• Implementation Test – The test was carried out to ascertain that the security 
protocol was implementable. 
 
Penetration Test  
 
Penetrative Tests were conducted on the server application implemented with the 
model to determine how resistant it is to unauthorized access, and to determine 
whether the encryption would be broken if the authentication scheme is breached. 
The reason for conducting the penetrative test on the service was to evaluate the 
level of security of the service built with the end-to-end layer (2nd Layer) of the 
security protocol. This test models the behavior of hackers.  
The aim of this test is to determine whether or not the service endpoints, protected 
with HMAC Authentication scheme, can be attacked.  
 
Test Tools for the Penetration Test  
 
REST has no descriptive document like the WSDL which normally details the 
entry points to the service; it is therefore difficult to test RESTful applications. 
However, some tools exist that are often used to simulate attacks on REST services. 
An example of such tools is the “Open Web Application Security Project Zed 
Attack Proxy” (OWASP ZAP). Penetrative tests were carried out using the 
following tools:  
 
• OWASP ZAP version 2.4.3  
• Fiddler Web Debugger version 4.6.2.0  
 
OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP) is an open source desktop application. It is an 
integrated testing tool that is used to find vulnerabilities in web application. 
“toolswatch.org” awarded it the top security tool in 2013 and is becoming a 
framework for advanced security testing. It has a feature known as “Plug-n-Hack” 
which is a plugin for Mozilla web browser that enables the application to listen to 
traffic on Mozilla browser.  
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Fiddler Web Debugger is a desktop application developed by “Telerik”. It is used 
to capture network traffic and debug web applications.   
 
SSL/TLS Test  
 
The last test carried out on the protocol was the SSL/TLS test. The purpose of this 
test is to evaluate the strength of the SSL/TLS. The core banking server was 
subjected to this test. The test examines the SSL/TLS configuration for the server 
for known SSL/TLS vulnerabilities such as POODLE, BEAST, BREACH, 
CRIME, etc. The tool used for testing the SSL/TLS layer is the “Qualys SSL  
Lab”. It is a web based application used to evaluate the SSL configuration of 
servers that implement SSL/TLS across the internet. SSL Lab also extends its API 
for use by many other SSL/TLS testing platforms.  
 
The aim of this test is to evaluate the server’s SSL/TLS configuration and to 
examine it for known vulnerabilities such as BREACH, POODLE, BEAST, etc.  
 
Test Tools for the SSL/TLS Test  
 
The SSL/TLS test was carried using Qualys SSL Lab. It is a free web based 
assessment tool for analyzing the SSL/TLS configuration of any SSL server on the 
Internet. It is a collaborative effort of top cloud security experts such as Ivan Ristic, 
Christian Folini and others. Since its launch in 2009, it has been used to scan 
various servers. SSL Lab examines four major parameters on the SSL/TLS 
configured server and grades the server based on these parameters. The four major 
parameters on which the server configuration is evaluated are: Certificate, Protocol 
Support, Key Exchange and Cipher Strength. Of these four parameters, only 
Protocol Support, Key Exchange and Cipher Strength are used for the overall 
grading. TABLE 1 shows the metrics for grading the result while TABLE 2 shows 
the examined parameters and the percentage contribution of each of the parameters 
to the overall grade.  
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Score >= 50  C  
Score >= 35  D  
Score >= 20  E  




This test was carried out by using the two applications that were developed to 
implement this protocol. In this test, the model core banking posting platform, 
which has the two end points, was deployed on one machine while the other 
application, the payment collection API, was deployed on another machine. 
 
Category  Score 
(%)  
Protocol Support  30  
Key Exchange  30  
Cipher Strength  40  
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The payment collection API sends fifty (50) payment records through a “POST” 
http method to the message service of the core banking service. The payment 
collection API also retrieves all fifty records in one single “GET” request. The 
payment collection API presents the HMAC scheme for  
the fifty posts. 
 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
We recall that two major problems were identified earlier in this paper as Prob 1 
and Prob 2. This paper solves those problems by offering a twofold result. 
 
Firstly,  the following artifacts were developed: A message encryption and 
decryption module, a message signing and signature verification scheme using 
HMAC, an SSL/TLS secured channel of communication was set up, a payment 
collection application programming interface (API) for Students’ Fees payment 
(service provider) was developed, a model core banking posting platform was 
developed. Secondly, results from testing modules and their workability were also 
documented.  
 
Using Feature Driven Development (FDD) software methodology, a two layer 
security protocol was developed. The first layer is a well hardened SSL/TLS 
configuration. The second layer is a well-designed end-to-end protocol that handles 
authentication, authorization, encryption and message integrity as well as timing 
and replay attack prevention. The end-to-end protocol uses HMAC-512 and a 
hybrid encryption system using the AES and RSA algorithms. The protocol was 
then compiled to a reusable library using C# language. Two different tests were 
carried out on this protocol: Penetration test and SSL/TLS configuration test. The 
Penetration Test was carried out using the Open Web Application Security Project 
Zed Attack Proxy (OWASP ZAP) application and Fiddler Web Debugger. The 
SSL/TLS test sought to test the SSL/TLS layer of the protocol for known 
vulnerabilities using a popular SSL/TLS test tool known as SSL Lab. The raw and 
scaled scores obtained from SSL Lab were 95% and 93% respectively. The results 
of Implementation test show that the protocol is implementable. The protocol is 
also resistant to such attacks as: Unauthorized, Timing and Replay attacks as shown 
by the result of the penetration test. The grade obtained from the SSL/TLS test is 
“A+”. The result also shows that the implementation is not vulnerable to currently 
known SSL attacks. 
 
Below, a brief discussion of the Penetration and SSL/TLS Tests are given. 
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Results and Discussion of the Penetration Test  
 
The “Open Web Application Security Project Zed Attack Proxy” (OWASP ZAP) 
tool was used to attack the application in a quick start mode and the Fiddler was 
used to analyze the captured traffic.  
 
Result of the Penetration Test  
 
When OWASP ZAP tool was used to attack, the tool did not break the 
authentication security mechanism built into the system. Error 401 was returned as 
shown in the diagram of FIG. 36. Similarly when Fiddler Web Debugger was used 
to capture the response from the server, the response code 401 was obtained.  The 
details of the result obtained from OWASP ZAP when Mozilla was used to access 
the protected endpoint, and the result obtained from Fiddler Web Debugger, is as 
shown below:   
  
“HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized  
  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
 
  Pragma: no-cache  
  Expires: -1  
 
Server: Microsoft-IIS/10.0  
 
WWW-Authenticate: fem  
 






Discussion of the Penetration Test  
 
HTTP response code 401 indicates an unauthorized request while response code 
200 indicates a success and that the requested resource is granted. Status code 401 
from two testing tools, OWASP ZAP and Fiddler indicates that the protected 
X - Powered - By: ASP.NET   
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endpoint cannot be accessed without providing the right authentication scheme 
“fem” which was used to protect the endpoint.  
 
Results and Discussion of the SSL/TLS Test  
 
The test examines the SSL/TLS configuration for the server for known SSL/TLS 
vulnerabilities such as POODLE, BEAST, BREACH, CRIME, etc. As explained 
in chapter three, the four major parameters on which the server configuration is 
evaluated are: Certificate, Protocol, Support, Key Exchange and Cipher Strength.  
 
Result of SSL/TLS Test  
 
The default configuration of the SSL/TLS after installing the certificate yielded a 
grade B result when subjected to Qualys SSL Lab test. When the SSL/TLS 
configuration was hardened by ordering the cipher suites to use strong 
cryptographic protocols, removing weak algorithms like RC4 and providing 
support for Forward Secrecy, a grade A was obtained as shown in FIG. 38.  
When HTTP Strict Transport Security was enabled and TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 TLS 
were removed, Qualys SSL Lab test yielded a grade A+. The result of the Qualys 
SSL Lab test on the SSL/TLS configuration is shown in TABLE 1. The transcript 
for the test is shown in Appendix A and from this transcript; all current SSL/TLS 
known vulnerabilities were avoided.  
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Discussion of SSL/TLS  
 
The second column of TABLE 1 shows the raw result obtained from the test. The 
average score is 95%. The third column shows the scaled scores based on the 
metrics shown in TABLE 6. Based on the scaled scores on the third column, the 
overall results of the test is 93%. The overall grade for the test is “A” based on the 
metrics shown in TABLE 5. This result is an indication of an excellent 
configuration. The graph showing the result is shown in FIG. 39. The transcript of 
the entire test is shown in Appendix A and the transcript shows the server is not 
vulnerable to known SSL/TLS vulnerabilities such as POODLE, BEAST, 
BREACH, CRIME, etc.   
 
The result also indicates that the SSL/TLS configuration supports Perfect Forward 
Secrecy (PFS). With PFS configuration, even if the encryption is broken and the 
secret key used to encrypt the session is recovered by an attacker, the attacker 
would not be able to decrypt previous messages sent with that key. ECDHE 
supports PFS; therefore, the cipher suites that contain ECDHE were moved to the 
top in order to ensure PFS. According to (Schum, 2014), ephemeral keys are 
temporary keys that are used to ensure forward secrecy. Systems that are 
configured to use PFS ensure better security that the ones not configured to use 
PFS (Higgins, 2013).   
In order to obtain a grade A+ in Qualys, a property known as 
“TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV” must be enabled in the SSL/TLS Configuration. 
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TLS_FALLBACKSCSV prevents an attacker from using TLS version lower than 
the maximum present value in a client. Windows server was used for the 
deployment and IIS does not support TLS_FALLBACKSCSV; therefore, the only 
way to achieve a grade A+ on Qualys on windows server is by disabling TLS 1.1 
and TLS 1.0. The downside of doing such is that browsers that do not support TLS 
1.2 would not be able to communicate with the service. However this does not 
constitute much problem as most browsers today have support for TLS 1.2. Only 
the old ones do not support it. The SCSV part of the  
 
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV  is  an  acronym  for  Signaling  Cipher 
 Suite Value.  
 
TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV "allows a browser to indicate to a server when the 
current connection being used or attempted is a fallback" (Helme, 2014). This 
feature simply allows the browser to report to the server that it (browser) supports 
a better protocol than what it is currently attempting to communicate the server 
with. When it is present in the client handshake, the server knows that the client 
has a better protocol and is only being tricked or forced to use the current weaker 





The end-to-end security layer works exactly the same way WS-Security works but 
without the extra burden of wrapping it in another protocol like SOAP. It 
implements the REST architecture fully. As shown by the results of the 
Implementation test, the protocol is not only implementable but also resilient to 
several known attacks such as replay, modification, eavesdropping, and 
unauthorized access from the results shown by the Penetration test. Weak 
encryption algorithms and hash functions such as RC4, MD5, DES and SHA-1 are 
avoided at both layers of the protocol because of their well-documented flaws. 
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is supported on this layer by generating a new 
cryptographic key for each encryption session. With PFS, previous messages 
cannot be decrypted by an attacker even if the encryption is cracked and the secret 
key used to encrypt the session is compromised.   
The SSL/TLS, which forms another protective layer, is configured to use strong 
cryptographic primitives. As shown by the result of the SSL/TLS test, hardening 
of the SSL/TLS configuration improves the security and in turn the confidence the 
potential users would have in adopting this protocol.   
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